Archive
61 pieces of security research, engineering and field notes.
OpenClaw's 470 advisories show how cloud AI platforms turn prompt handling, tool calls and host execution into an unauthenticated RCE pattern at scale.
Authentication bypass keeps recurring because modern applications validate identity at convenient edges, then perform critical operations in layers that no longer know whether access was proven.
Supply chain compromise is shifting from static package poisoning towards runtime weaponisation, where trusted code becomes a credential harvester, traffic broker or covert infrastructure node after deployment.
CIFSwitch CVE-2026-46243 and PraisonAI show why vertical movement often follows from designs that let low-trust identities shape high-trust operations.
Gogs, PraisonAI and KnowledgeDeliver show why authentication bypass in self-hosted platforms is often an architectural failure, not a missing if statement.
MCP-based AI orchestration moves OAuth tokens, access grants and memory persistence into the same execution path. Credential handling is now the weakest link in the AI supply chain.
May 2026 supply-chain compromises showed that poisoned developer tooling now targets the identity and execution layer before code reaches a repository.
Supply chain compromise has shifted from stealing credentials to poisoning package ecosystems through compromised CI/CD systems, maintainer accounts and trusted execution paths.
maboloshi/github-chinese inserted third-party translation API responses into GitHub pages as HTML. PR #692 changes that untrusted response handling to text nodes.
RAGFlow's deserialize_b64 helper defaulted to bare pickle.loads behind an unset safety flag. PR #14803 makes RestrictedUnpickler the only path.
getsentry/XcodeBuildMCP accepted MCP tool parameters that could reach /bin/sh -c through unsafe double-quote escaping. PR #289 replaces that path with POSIX single-quote escaping and adds regression coverage.
Google Project Zero's Pixel 10 zero-click chain shows how Android hardening changes exploit shape without removing reachable attack surface in media parsing and device drivers.
Recent vm2, NodeVM and Ollama flaws show a recurring failure pattern: developer-friendly JavaScript isolation is being treated as a hard security boundary when the runtime was never designed to provide one.
